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 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, the Ninth 
Circuit dealt with the conflict of science in making legal and policy 
decisions. NMFS was held to a stringent mitigation standard to protect 
marine mammals against the Navy’s use of LFA sonar for military 
operations. In this decision the court held that agencies are required to 
apply the least practicable adverse impact on marine mammals in these 
types of operations and agencies must listen to their own experts when 




In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Humane Society of the United 
States, the Cetacean Society International, the Ocean Futures Society, 
Jean-Michel Cousteau, and Michael Stocker (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
challenged and sought an injunction against the National Marine 
Fisheries Service’s (“NMFS”) Final Rule authorizing the incidental take 
of marine mammals in connection with the Navy’s peacetime use of low-
frequency sonar system (“LFA”) for training, testing, and routine 
operations.1 The Plaintiffs contended that NMFS’s mitigation measures 
did not satisfy the Marine Mammal Protection Act’s (“MMPA”) least 
practicable adverse impact standard.2 The United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in 
favor of NMFS on the issue of compliance with the MMPA,3 holding 
that although NMFS has the discretion to choose mitigation measures, 
the least practicable adverse impact is a “stringent standard” that NMFS 
is required to adopt.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s principles but reversed and 
remanded the ruling, disagreeing with its procedure and holding  
NMFS’s Final Rule did not satisfy the least practicable adverse impact 
standard.5  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Congress enacted the MMPA due to concern that “marine 
mammal species and population stocks were in danger of extinction or 
                                                 
1. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, No. 14-16375, 
___F.3d___, 2016 WL 3854207 (9th Cir. July 15, 2016). 
2.  Id. at *1. 
3.  Id. at *2. 
4.  Id.  
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depletion due to human activity.” 6  The MMPA prohibits harassing, 
hunting, capturing, or killing marine mammals—activities that 
collectively are known as a “take.” The MMPA authorizes exceptions to 
this broad prohibition, which allow NMFS to take “small numbers” of 
marine mammals for specified activities for up to five years. 7  An 
authorized incidental take must meet two requirements.8 First, NMFS 
must find the total take will have a “negligible impact.”9 Second, NMFS 
must impose regulations that set forth “permissible methods of taking” as 
well as “other means” of achieving the least practicable adverse impact 
on species stock and habitat. 10  The least practicable adverse impact 
standard applies both to “permissible methods of taking” for such 
activity and to “other means” of reducing incidental take.11 
The U.S. Navy uses LFA sonar for peacetime operations, and 
determined it is the most effective way to detect potentially hostile 
foreign submarines.12 LFA sonar can harm a variety of marine mammal 
species, particularly “low-frequency hearing specialists” such as whales, 
seals, and walruses. 13  The MMPA classifies LFA sonar into two 
categories.14 “Level A harassment” are sound pulses of 180 dB or greater 
that directly injure or are likely to injure marine mammals,15 and “Level 
B harassment” are sound pulses below 180 dB that indirectly interfere 
with normal behavioral patterns of marine mammals.16 
Most recently, NMFS issued a final rule authorizing incidental 
take of marine mammals by LFA sonar in 2012 (“Final Rule”).17 The 
Final Rule includes three mitigation measures to minimize the impact of 
the Navy’s incidental take.18 The first requires the Navy to shut down or 
delay LFA sonar use if it detects a nearby marine mammal.19 The second 
prohibits the Navy from creating LFA sonar pulses of 180 dB or greater 
within “costal exclusion zones” which extend 22 km off of any 
coastline.20 The third prohibits the Navy from creating LFA sonar pulses 
of 180 dB or greater within a kilometer of designated “offshore 
biologically important areas” (“OBIAs”).21 OBIAs are protected marine 
                                                 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id.   
8.  Id. (citing 16 U.S.C.§ 1371(a)(5)(A)(i)(I) (2012)).    
9.  Id. (citing 16 U.S.C.§ 1371(a)(5)(A)(i)(II)(aa)).    
10.  Id.   
11.  Id.   
12.  Id. at *3. 
13.  Id.  
14.  Id.   
15.  Id.   
16.  Id. at *3. 
17. Id. at *4; see Taking and Importing Marine Mammals: Taking 
Marine Mammals Incidental to U.S. Navy Operations of Surveillance Towed Array 
Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 77 Fed. Reg. 50290 (Aug. 20, 2012).  
18. Id.  at *4. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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areas that provide marine mammals with relatively low-noise 
environments.22  
For the Final Rule, NMFS flagged 73 candidate OBIAs by 
consulting, amongst other measures, a 2010 White Paper written by four 
senior NMFS “subject matter experts.”23 The White Paper cautioned that 
identifying OBIAs based only on known data would be difficult as data-
poor regions did not equate to regions with no population or biological 
importance of marine mammals and habitat. 24  However, neither the 
White Paper nor NMFS’s subject matter experts were involved in 
drafting the Final Rule, and NMFS used significantly different criteria 
than recommended in the White Paper.25 As a result, NMFS cut several 
areas that the subject matter experts nominated for protection, stating its 
reason for cutting so many potential OBIAs was lack of sufficient data.26 
The Plaintiffs asserted the three mitigation measures were not 
sufficient to meet the MMPA’s required “least practicable adverse 
impact” on marine mammals.27 While, the Plaintiffs did not challenge the 
shutdown protocol or costal exclusion zone, they stated that, taken as a 
whole, these measures were inadequate to make up for the deficiencies in 
the designation of OBIAs. 28  The district court found that NMFS 
complied with the MMPA and granted summary judgement.29 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the ruling, stating that NMFS’s Final 




The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Final Rule under both the 
MMPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 31  First, it 
analyzed the Final Rule’s mitigation measures to see if it achieved the 
”stringent standard” required by the MMPA of the “least practicable 
adverse impact” on marine mammals.32 Second, it looked specifically at 
the Final Rule’s OBIA designation under the APA, which states that a 
court will only set aside a final agency action if it is found to be 
“arbitrary and capricious.”33  
 
 
                                                 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id.  at *8 (The 2010 White Paper was entitled Identifying Areas of 
Biological Importance to Cetaceans in Data-Poor Regions (see 77 Fed. Reg. at 
50300)).  
24. Id.  at *8. 
25.  Id.  
26. Id.  at *9. 
27.  Id.  at *7. 
28.  Id. 
29. Id.  at *2. 
30. Id.   
31. Id.  at *9. 
32. Id.  at *5. 
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A. Least Practicable Adverse Impact 
 
NMFS argued there were several reasons why it was not required 
to comply with the stringent standard of ensuring the “least practicable 
adverse impact” on marine mammals.34 First, it contended that once a 
“negligible impact” finding is concluded, then it “must allow the 
activity” and the only mitigation measures needed are ones that allow the 
activity to go forward.35 The Ninth Circuit looked to the statutory text 
and found that mitigation to achieve the “least practicable adverse 
impact” is an independent threshold issue, not a secondary follow up 
requirement, which is central to whether NMFS can authorize an 
incidental take.36 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined Congress’s 
mandate that “NMFS must find negligible impact ‘and’ set forth 
regulations to minimize adverse impact in order to authorize incidental 
take makes the independent nature of these requirements clear.”37 
Next, NMFS contended that the mitigation requirement was 
unnecessary because the agency “cannot mitigate adverse population-
level impacts to any degree less than zero.”38 The Ninth Circuit found 
this argument was based on a “misreading of the agency’s own 
implementing regulations.”39 NMFS incorrectly applied the “negligible 
impact” definition of the MMPA. Read properly, the MMPA states that 
even if the threat to population levels are not significant, the agency still 
must adopt mitigation measures aimed at protecting marine mammals to 
the greatest extent practicable in light of military readiness needs.40 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that NMFS is required to establish 
regulations to achieve the “least practicable adverse impact” before it can 
authorize an incidental take, and that the agency’s finding of negligible 
impact on populations did not satisfy this standard for mitigation.41 The 
Ninth Circuit also held the Final Rule failed to meet the requirements of 
this standard because it did not offer consideration of the fact that 
“practicable” mitigation measures must balance the impact of LFA on 




NMFS raised two arguments for why it did not adopt the number 
of OBIAs recommended by the subject matter experts. First, it argued the 
final designation of OBIAs was not arbitrary and capricious, as the 
Plaintiffs asserted, because the Final Rule considered and explained its 
                                                 
34. Id.  at *5. 
35. Id.   
36.  Id.   
37.  Id.   
38.  Id.   
39.  Id.  at *6. 






2016 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 5 
 
decision not to adopt the White Paper’s recommendations, which is all 
that is required under the APA.43 Second, NMFS reasoned that OBIAs 
are but one component of a “suite” of mitigation measures.44 
In rebutting NMFS’s arguments the Ninth Circuit held that 
NMFS’s decisions must be evaluated under both the APA, as well as the 
MMPA’s “least practicable adverse impact” requirement.45  Under the 
MMPA, NMFS failed to adopt measures to meet the ”stringent standard” 
required for three reasons.46 First, NMFS did not evaluate why it chose 
an option that risked overlooking biologically important areas.47 Second, 
NMFS offered no explanation why it chose to forgo protections that 
would have reduced impacts on marine mammals.48 Third, NMFS made 
no mention of military practicability in the actual rule.49  
Regarding NMFS’s first argument, the Ninth Circuit held the 
Final Rule was in “direct conflict with the conclusion of its own 
experts,” which under the APA is arbitrary and capricious. 50  NMFS 
stated the White Paper’s criteria for designating OBIAs was different 
than what it used, but offered no explanation as to why NMFS’s criteria 
was equally or more capable of meeting the statutory standard. The Ninth 
Circuit held NMFS’s approach was a policy choice and not a scientific 
decision. Therefore, it did not meet the stringent standard that mitigation 
measures result in the “least practicable adverse impact” on marine 
mammals under the MMPA and was arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA.51 
NMFS’s second argument was that OBIAs are but one 
component of a “suite” of mitigation measures.52 However, the other two 
mitigation measures applied regardless of whether an area is considered 
potentially biologically important or not. 53  Therefore, the only 
heightened protection possible under the agency’s plan was an OBIA 
designation.54 Because shutdown zones around LFA sonar are not large 
enough to protect marine mammals from Level B effects, OBIAs are one 
of only two mitigation measures capable of reducing this level of 
harassment.55 As a result, the Ninth Circuit determined the record does 
not show the other mitigation measures are able to achieve the least 
practicable adverse impact without OBIAs.56 
 
                                                 
43.  Id.  at *9. 
44.  Id. at *11. 
45.  Id. at *9. 
46.  Id.  at *9, 10. 
47.  Id.  at *10. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  at *11. 
51. Id.   
52. Id.   
53. Id.   
54. Id.   
55. Id.  at *12. 








In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, the Ninth 
Circuit held the MMPA requires NMFS to achieve the least practicable 
adverse impact standard in addition to finding a negligible impact in 
order to authorize an incidental take of marine mammal species, stock, 
and habitat.57 Further, by not giving adequate protection to the OBIAs 
determined important by its own experts, NMFS made a policy instead of 
a scientific decision which was arbitrary and capricious. The Ninth 
Circuit in this decision determined that agencies should be held to a high 
scientific standard in making their decisions. Agencies are required to 
achieve the least practicable adverse impact standard when protecting 
from incidental take and are required to listen to the advice of their own 
experts in making these decisions. This decision is a step forward in 
setting standards around scientific uncertainty when making policy and 
legal decisions. This case will be remanded back to the district court 
which will further decide how to apply this standard, both procedurally 
and substantively, to agency decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
57. Id. at *13. 
